Introduction
To describe the response of engineering complex systems to various damage mechanics, engineers have traditionally use number-valued utilities to describe the results of di erent possible outcomes, and (number-valued) probabilities (often, subjective probabilities) to describe the relative frequency of di erent outcomes. This description is based on the assumption that experts can always make a definite preference between two possible outcomes, i.e., that the set of all outcomes is linearly (totally) ordered.
In practice, experts often cannot make a choice, their preference is only a partial order. For example, one of the main criteria for a tank design is that the tank retain most of its functionality after a direct hit. It is, however, di cult to describe the remaining functionality (utility) by a single numerical value. Some designs place more protection on the tank's weapons; so, when a tank is hit, it will retain most of its shooting capabilities{but its movement abilities may be severely damaged. In other designs, there is more protection on the engine and on the tracks, so the tank may lose its shooting abilities{but keep its ability to move fast. It is di cult to make a de nite selection because depending on the battle eld situation, di erent designs will work best: in active defense, an immobilized tank is still a valuable shooting force{and thus of much larger value than a moving tank with no shooting capabilities{while in a fast long-distance attack, an immobilized tank is practically useless.
In such situations, when we use traditional totally-ordered techniques, we thus force an expert to make a more or less arbitrary choice between two di cultto-compare outcomes; di erent choices lead to di erent numerical values of utilities and probabilities and{as a result{to di erent decisions.
It is therefore desirable to come up with a decision-making procedure that would be robust, i.e., that would only depend on the actual expert choices.
The main reason why the traditional number-valued approach to decision making is widely used is that this approach is based on a solid foundation: there are axioms, principles that|if true|uniquely lead to probabilities, utilities, and corresponding techniques for decision making. Most of these principles are pretty reasonable, with the exception of one: that the corresponding ordering of alternatives is \total" (\linear"). Traditional decision theory (see, e.g., 2, 3]) is based on the assumption that a person whose preferences we want to describe can always (linearly) order his preferences, i.e., that for every two alternatives a and a 0 , he can decide: { whether a is better than a 0 (we will denote it by a 0 a); { or whether a 0 is better than a (a a 0 ); { or whether a and a 0 are (for this person) of the same quality (we will denote it by a a 0 ).
A similar assumption (often implicit) underlies the traditional description of degrees of belief (\subjective probabilities") by numbers from the interval 0,1].
As we have mentioned, in real life, an expert may not be able to always compare two di erent alternatives. In this paper, we provide an exact description of decision making under partial ordering of alternatives. In turns out that in general, the uncertainty of each situation is characterized not by a scalar linearly ordered quantity (probability), but by a matrix-type partially ordered quantity (ordered operator).
Important particular cases are interval-valued probabilities and more general algebraic structures described by S. Markov In this section, we will mainly follow standard de nitions (see, e.g., 2, 3]), but we will not always follow them exactly: in some cases, we will slightly rephrase these de nitions (without changing their mathematical contents) so as to make the following transition to partially ordered preferences as clear as possible.
De nition 1. Let A be a set; this set will be called the set of alternatives (or the set of pure alternatives). By a lottery on A we understand a a probability measure on A with nite support. In other words, a lottery is a pair hA; pi, where A = fa 1 ; : : : ; a n g A is a nite subset of A, and p is a mapping p : A ! 0; 1] for which p(a i ) 0 and P p(a i ) = 1. A lottery will also denoted as p(a 1 ) a 1 +: : :+p(a n ) a n : We do not consider lotteries with in nite numbers of alternatives, because every real-life randomizing device, be it a dice or a computer-based random number generator, produces only nitely many possibilities.
The set of lotteries will be denoted by L. On this set L, we can naturally de ne an operation of probability combination as a convex combination of the corresponding probability measures: namely, if we have m values q 1 ; : : : ; q m 2 0; 1] with P q j = 1, and m lotteries`j = hA j ; p j i, then we can de ne the probability combination`= q 1 `1 + : : : + q m `m as a lottery`= hA; pi with A = A j and p(a) = P q j p j (a), where the sum is taken over all j for which a 2 A j . De nition 2. Let A be a set, and let L be the set of all lotteries over A. By a preference relation, we mean a pair h ; i, where is a (strict) order on L, is an equivalence relation on L, and for every`;`0;`0 0 2 L and every p 2 (0; 1), the following conditions hold: One can also show that every Archimedean (in some reasonable sense) linearly ordered preference relation h ; i can be described by an appropriate scalar utility function.
New Approach: Utility Theory for Partially Ordered Preferences
It turns out that a similar result holds for partially ordered references as well.
To describe this result, we need to to recall a few de nitions. An a ne space (see, e.g., 5] and references therein) is \almost" a vector space, the main di erence between them is that in the linear space, there is a xed starting point (0), while in the a ne space, there is no xed point. Recall that for every subset S V of an a ne space, its a ne hull A(S) can be de ned as the smallest a ne subspace containing S, i.e., equivalently, as the set of all a ne combinations Example. In the above tank example, it is natural to describe each possible damage outcome by a vector-valued utility (u 1 ; u 2 ), where u 1 describes the tank's shooting abilities and u 2 the tank's moving abilities. This is, of course, a simplied example, we also need to take into consideration communication capabilities, possibility of damage repair, etc.{which leads to a higher-dimensional utility vector. 4 How to Describe Degrees of Belief (\Subjective Probabilities") for Partially Ordered Preferences?
In traditional (scalar) utility theory, it is possible to describe our degree of belief ps(E) in each statement E, e.g., as follows: We pick two alternatives a 0 and a 1 with utilities 0 and 1, and as the degree of belief in E, we take the utility of a conditional alternative \if E then a 1 else a 0 " (or (Eja 1 ja 0 ), for short). This utility is also called subjective probability because if E is a truly random event which occurs with probability p, then this de nition leads to ps(E) = p: Indeed, according to the convexity-preserving property of a utility function, we have ps(E) = u(Eja 1 ja 0 ) = p u(a 1 ) + (1 ? p) u(a 0 ) = p 1 + (1 ? p) 0 = p: (1) How can a similar description look like for partially ordered preferences? Before we formulate our result, let us rst explain our reasoning that led to this result. The linear-ordered case de nition of subjective probability ps(E) can be rewritten as follows: for every two lotteries`;`0 2 L, we have u(Ej`j`0) = ps(E) u(`) + (1 ? ps(E)) u(`0); (2) or, equivalently, u(Ej`j`0) = ps(E) (u(`) ? u(`0)) + u(`0): (3) In other words, we can interpret ps(E) as a linear operator which transforms the utility di erence u(`) ? u(`0) into an expression u(Ej`j`0) ? u(`0) = ps(E) (u(`) ? u(`0)):
(4) It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that for partially ordered preferences, when we have multi-dimensional (vector) utilities with values in a vector space V , ps(E) would also be a linear operator, but this time from V to V (and not from R to R). We will now show that this expectation is indeed true.
De nition 9. Let A be a set, let L be the set of all lotteries over A, and let E be a formula (called event). By a conditional lottery, we mean an expression of the type P p i `i + P q k (Ej`0 k j`0 0 k ), where P p i + P q k = 1, and`i,`0 k , and`0 0 k are lotteries. We will denote the set of all conditional lotteries by L(E).
The meaning of a conditional lottery is straightforward: with probability p i , we run a lottery`i, and with probability q k , we run a conditional event \if E then`0 k else`0 0 k ".
Idea of the proof. An ordering relation in an n-dimensional space is characterized by a closed convex cone of all non-negative elements such that V is a linear hull of the cone. This cone is convex hull of its extreme generators; thus, we can nd n generators e i that form a base of a linear space V . To describe T, it is su cient to know T(e i ) for all i. For each generator e i 0, the condition 0 T(e i ) e i implies that T(e i ) belongs to the same cone generator, i.e., that T(e i ) = i e i for some real number i 0. So, to describe T, it is enough to know n values i . Q.E.D. Comment. Other results show that for most ordered vector spaces, we need even fewer parameters.
